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ABSTRACT
Title of Research paper:

Analysis of Human Factors in Ship Collisions Based on
Accident Investigation Reports

Degree:

MSc

Based on maritime accident investigation reports, this dissertation investigates
human factors in ship collisions using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System(HFACS) framework, which originated in the field of aviation safety and has
since been introduced to other fields, including railroads and maritime transport.

21 ship collision investigation reports that occurred in China in 2020 are examined in
a case study, in which human factors are described and analyzed in detail at four
levels, namely organizational influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for
unsafe acts and unsafe acts. This study finds that the direct and obvious factors of
unsafe acts are fully demonstrated in the investigation reports, but the potential,
non-direct factors of organizational influence and unsafe supervision are not
sufficiently revealed in the investigation reports, although these factors play an
important role in causing accidents.

This paper suggests that human factors remain difficult to address, most notably
because it is a systemic problem. Mitigating this problem requires a system approach,
rather than a person approach. Not only does regulation need to be effectively
implemented, but the maritime culture of efficiency/economy over safety needs to be
changed. To do this, the top down structure of shipping companies must be changed
to empower crew members to participate in making decisions that affect their safety
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and interests. In addition, automation technologies cannot be expected to eliminate
the human element; at best, they only allow it to change places and forms. Last but
not least, the world is still suffering from the Covid-19 pandemic. The shipping
industry, governments, and international organizations must work together to address
the challenge of crew change and dispatch, as well as the physical and mental health
of seafarers in order for the industry to remain viable in the future.

KEY WORDS: Human factor, Ship collision accidents, HFACS, Investigation
reports
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1.1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Research on maritime accidents have shown that ship collision accidents are the most
common type among all kinds of maritime accidents. A study by Zhang et al. (2021)
on global maritime accidents between 2003 and 2018 found that ship collisions
accounted for the highest proportion of maritime accidents at 19% (see Figure 1).
According to the same authors, ship collisions in East Asia, including China and
Japan, accounted for 40.33% of all maritime accidents, 30% higher than groundings,
which were in the second place.

１

Figure 1 - Distribution of global maritime accidents by initial events.
Source: Adapted from Zhang et al. (2021).

Among the many factors that contribute to ship collisions, human factors are the
most important. Numerous studies have shown that human error accounts for more
than 90% of all ship collisions. More and more efforts are being made to improve
marine transportation safety, with the development of better ship design and
advanced shipbuilding technology, as well as state-of-the-art navigational equipment
on ships. It is expected that the continuous improvement of hardware and software of
ship systems will enhance the safety of shipping safety. And indeed, ship collisions
caused by defects in ship design or shipbuilding, or equipment failure (rudder failure,
main engine failure, etc.) have been greatly reduced. However, collisions caused by
human factors are not.

２

1.2 Review of previous research

Through literature review, this paper describes the research of human factors of ship
collision accidents, and the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
(HFACS) in transportation safety analysis, including in aviation, railway and the
maritime industry.

1.2.1 Human factors in ship collision accidents
Many scholars have carried out a lot of research work in the study of human factors
in ship collision accidents. Using data mining technology, Liu & Wu (2004)
established the relationship between human errors and their influencing factors
(including human factors, environmental factors, ship factors and organizational
factors) based on 100 ship collision accident investigation reports of the world's
major maritime countries during the 10 years from 1993 to 2002. The research
established the correspondence between human errors and their inducing factors in
the process of ship collision. This paper is one of the earliest studies on human
factors based on accident investigation reports in China. However, the study was
based on data from 20 years ago, when technology and the shipping industry were
very different, which means it may not be well suited to the current situation. In
addition, the study itself notes that their efforts to extract better information and data
on human factors from these accident investigation reports are weakened by the
limited quality of the investigation reports on which their conclusions are based.
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Hetherington et al. (2006) reviewed a number of studies that investigated navigation
safety from three perspectives: themes in accidents, human error, and safety
interventions. Their analysis identified the role of humans and organizations in
shipping accidents, and an improvement in shipping safety is possible if human
factors problems can be detected and corrected. Celik & Cebi (2009) generated an
analytical HFACS based on the Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy Process (FAHP) to
determine the role of human error in shipping accidents. Chauvin et al. (2013) used
the HFACS model to determine the contributing factors of 39 ship collisions and
concluded that most collisions were caused by poor decision making, highlighting
the importance of Bridge Resource Management (BRM) when navigating in
restricted waters and that correct decision making by the master in an emergency
situation in open water can prevent most emergencies, while non-compliance with
Safety Management System (SMS) will lead to more emergencies. Strauch (2015)
explored the main causes of fatigue and how it disrupts cognitive performance and
affects safety, arguing that fatigue is one of the most important human factors
contributing to accidents and proposing a systematic approach to determine whether
fatigue adversely affected the performance of seafarers in accidents. The authors
remind investigators to be aware of seafarers' errors related to their fatigue in
accident investigations and that different measures should be used to determine
fatigue and its causal relationship with the accident.
Research by Galieriková (2019) offers another example of how to incorporate human
factors into accident investigation programs. The HFACS was used in this study as a
taxonomy for human factors for accident investigation. The author claimed that the
fundamental issue of the HFACS is the coding process, which is comprised of
nineteen sections. The author used Reason's (1990) Swiss Cheese Model to classify
the types of human errors into three main categories: unsafe acts, unsafe supervision,
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and organizational factors ， presented recommendations on how to classify causal
factors of marine transport accidents.
A study by Coraddu et al. (2020) argues that marine accidents are complex events,
and analyzing how humans factor into a collision is particularly difficult. HFACS,
human reliability assessment, and simple statistical analysis, they claim, are not
always effective because they rely on human experts and are subject to limitations,
biases, and high costs. Using historical maritime incident databases, the authors
suggest a data-driven approach to identify the most influential human factors. Chen
et al. (2020) identified the main factors associated with 3976 total-loss marine
accidents in the past 20 years. A total of 11 variables were also chosen as
independent variables to analyze and forecast the probability of deaths due to total
loss marine accidents.
Based on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) database, Paolo et al. (2021)
identified and categorized causal themes from 1079 sea accidents, and found fatigue,
stress, work pressure, and poor communication were often important factors in
accidents in the 24-hour environment of shipping, where ships and crews are
routinely pushed to the limit. Fan et al. (2020) used a data-driven Bayesian Network
(BN) to investigate the effect of human factors on maritime safety. Tree Augmented
Network (TAN) was used to model the inter-dependency among the risk influencing
factors, and it was validated by both sensitivity analysis and past accident records.
According to their findings, age, operation, voyage segment, information, and
condition of the vessel are among the critical risk factors for all accident types.
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1.2.2 HFACS in transportation

Analyzing civil and military aviation accidents, Shappell & Wiegmann (2000) found
that 70 to 80 percent of them are caused by human error. They found most accident
reporting systems did not address human error with any theoretical framework,
making most accident databases unsuitable for traditional human error analysis, as
well as making establishing intervention strategies difficult. Therefore, they
developed a comprehensive Human Factors Analysis and Classification System, a
general framework for human error investigation that can be used to design new
investigation methods and reorganize existing accident databases. Today, the
HFACS framework is used in military, commercial, and general aviation to examine
potential human factors and improve aviation accident investigations.

In large part, HFACS is based on Reason's (1990) Swiss Cheese Model and provides
a tool to assist investigators and to improve training and prevention efforts. With
HFACS, investigators can identify potential and active failures within an
organization that ultimately lead to an accident. HFACS does not seek to assign
blame, but rather to understand the cause of an accident.

The HFACS framework (see Figure 2) describes human error at each of the four
levels of failure. These include:
1. Unsafe acts of the operator,
2. Preconditions for unsafe behavior,
3. Unsafe supervision,
4. Organizational influences.
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Figure 2 - The HFACS framework originally used for human factors analysis in
aviation safety.
Source: adapted from Shappell & Wiegmann (2000).

HFACS develops causal categories to identify active and potential failures at each
level. An adverse event can be caused by a failure at every level, and will be
prevented if one of the failures leading to it is corrected at any time.

Since its introduction, the HFACS model has been used extensively in the
investigation and analysis of human factors in the field of aviation safety, and has
been tested to be an effective method in practice. Subsequently, the model has been
gradually extended to other fields, including in the fields of navigation, railway, coal
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mining, construction, chemical industry, etc. Researchers have carried out a number
of research work on human factors based on HFACS in these areas.

Dambier & Hinkelbein (2006) used the German National Aircraft Accident Analysis
Department's reports to classify aircraft accidents in German general aviation using
the HFACS model and to identify their possible causes. The underlying causes were
categorized as follows: pilot error, organizational factors, ergonomic factors,
aeromedical problems, and crew resource management. They found the majority of
accidents occurred during approach and landing (53%) caused by pilot error (84%).
Thus, pilots should train on approach and landing to achieve higher proficiency.
Wiegmann et al. (2005) argued that HFACS can be reliable in identifying human
causal factors in aviation accidents, helping to identify general trends in human
factors and pilot errors that are responsible for accidents involving civil aircraft, as
well as being able to analyze human errors and contribute to the development of
interventions to prevent accidents in the future.

Daramola (2014) applied the HFACS framework to assess Nigerian aviation
accidents from 1985 to 2008 and found that Nigeria's accident and fatality rates were
higher than the global average in most years. The analysis concluded that skill-based
errors, physical environment and poor supervision were the most common causes
categories of air accidents and concluded that the most likely causal chain in
Nigerian aviation accidents was considered to be regulatory violations - crew
resource management - decision errors. Yan & Histon (2014) examined 267 safety
investigation reports from North American commercial airlines between 2006 and
2010, and concluded that unsafe acts and the preconditions of unsafe acts continue to
be the most significant human factors risks. In addition, the study identified Crew
Resource Management (CRM) as a primary causes of accidents and recommended
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that safety departments increase training and develop risk-mitigation methods to
enhance aviation safety. KiLic & GÜMÜŞ (2020) concluded that operational
problems faced by pilots while performing night flights (e.g., night vision, blinkers,
black hole illusions, and reflections) pose a threat to flight safety. HFACS was used
to study 30 nighttime commercial aircraft accidents that occurred during the past five
years. They found the physical environment to be the most important causal factor,
while skill-based errors were the second most important contributor, and perceptual
and decision errors to be the third most important factors.

HFACS was later introduced by researchers in other industries, such as rail transport.
Baysari et al. (2008) applied the HFACS model to 40 Australian rail safety accident
investigation reports and found that nearly half of the accidents were caused by
equipment failure, which was most likely due to poor maintenance and monitoring.
Most of the other accidents were caused by inattention coupled with decreased
alertness and physical fatigue. Almost all safety incidents involved organizational
influence level factors, demonstrating the benefits of improving resource
management, organizational climate, and organizational processes in order to reduce
rail safety incidents. Iridiastadi & Ikatrinasari (2012) analyzed nine accidents with
fatalities using HFACS based on the data provided by the National Transportation
Safety Commission (NTSC) of Indonesia. The results indicated that 72 factors were
closely related to these accidents. Although train drivers play an important role in
accidents, interventions aimed at them alone are not sufficient. The four dimensions
of HFACS should be used to create a comprehensive approach to accident prevention.
Madigan et al. (2016) used HFACS to examine 78 minor safety incident reports on
UK railroads involving five accident types and found that these reports focused
strongly on active failures, particularly those related to work-related distractions and
environmental factors, with little mention of underlying factors. The study suggests
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that particular attention should be paid to potential factors at the level of
organizational influence and unsafe supervision when investigating minor rail
accidents.

A growing number of studies in maritime transportation safety also have adopted this
analytical framework. Kim et al. (2011) reviewed the root cause classification system
for maritime accident investigation and outlined some typical human error analysis
methods used in shipping. They proposed a human error analysis method based on
the cognitive process model, the maritime HFACS model, and the chain of causality
of maritime accidents, and tested its efficacy using real-world data. Chen et al. (2013)
developed a framework of Human and Organizational Factors (HOFs) specifically
for maritime accident investigation and analysis, called the Human Factors Analysis
and Classification System for Maritime Accidents (HFACS-MA). They combined it
with the Why-Because Graph for accident analysis to provide a complementary
measure for the practical application of HFACS. The paper used the Herald of Free
Enterprise disaster as a case study to show that a more comprehensive understanding
of accidents can be obtained through HFACS. Akyuz (2017) combined HFACS with
Analytical Network Process (ANP) to construct a hybrid approach for assessing
safety factors in cargo ship accidents. HFACS provides a diagrammatic conceptual
framework for investigating and analyzing the role of human error in maritime
accidents, while ANP illuminates the causal chain of accidents and shows the
feasibility of the hybrid approach using a real-life example of a LPG ship spilling
accident.

According to Kim et al. (2017), a human factors investigation process can provide
maritime accident investigators with a guide for identifying and classifying human
error-induced factors as well as development of safety actions for minimizing

１０

maritime accident risks. The case study illustrates that human factors investigations
can identify potential factors and contribute to developing safety actions to prevent
similar accidents in the future. Yıldırım et al. (2019) examined collisions and
grounding accidents by using HFACS and examined the frequency and distribution
of causes, and analyzed unsafe acts and preconditions for unsafe acts according to
the bridge crew structure. It was found that decision errors, resource management
deficits, violations, skill-based errors, and communication errors were the most
important human factors for ship collisions and groundings.

1.3

Comments on existing research

Through the above review, this paper finds that the current research on human
factors of ship collisions presents the following characteristics:
(1) The data of the research works are mainly based on the investigation reports
of maritime safety accidents. Through analyzing the maritime safety accident
investigation reports collected, useful information such as the types and frequencies
of factors leading to accidents are extracted and used as the basic data for the
research work. However, the accident-causing factors extracted in previous studies
mainly focus on the factors reflected in the process of ship collision, such as the
crew's error in the collision avoidance process and the weather and sea conditions at
the time of the collision. The hidden factors at the level of organization and
management, supervision and guidance are not fully utilized in the report.
(2) The research method mostly uses HFACS, Bayesian Networks, Tree
Augmented Network and other uncertain knowledge inference methods. The purpose
is to use historical data to find the most likely causal chain leading to the accidents.
The specific approach is often driven by the collision results for reverse inference,
looking for the highest probability of the upper level of factors, and finally come up
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with a most likely causal chain.

It can be said that the research work on how unsafe

behaviors lead to ship collisions has been carried out adequately, and a large number
of research results have been achieved.

But few studies are developed on how deeper hidden factors, such as the structural
issues behind human factors, influence unsafe behavior. And obviously there is a
lack of in-depth discussion on the impact of automation technology and the Covid-19
pandemic on the human factors of maritime accidents. In a word, HFACS can be a
very powerful tool for digging deeper into the hidden factors of an accident, as the
categories of factors can be exhaustively and rationally classified through a clear
framework.

1.4

Objective of this study

So far most of the research work on human factors in ship collision accidents has
been carried out by many researchers, and there are many research methods and tools
used by them. Among them, HFACS has been widely used in analyzing human
factors in accidents, and with good results. This research paper will apply the
HFACS model to the study of human factors in ship collisions based on the currently
available investigation reports of maritime accidents in China in 2020, which will
help to further understand the human factors in ship collisions, as well as to come up
with effective intervention measures to prevent accidents, protect human lives,
property, and the environment.

Furthermore, while the significant impact of human factors has been recognized,
researchers and stakeholders in the shipping industry have addressed human factors
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with a disproportionate focus on the crews themselves, believing that the negative
effects of human factors can be mitigated or eliminated through better education and
training of crews and strict adherence to operational procedures. However, if we
delve into the real mechanisms by which accidents occur, and not just the actions or
inaction of crew members, we will find that attributing accidents to the actions of
seafarers is usually an oversimplified understanding of a complex system. Ship
safety is a complex system involving not only the ship and crew, but also the
environment, shipping companies, authorities, laws and regulations. Members of the
crew, who operate the ship directly, are only one component of a ship's safety system.
Despite their impact on the system, they are also affected and constrained by other
aspects of the system. In order to understand the human element, we need to analyze
structural aspects of the human factor within the context of an industry's operations,
not only looking at their behavior and consequences, but also at the drivers of their
behavior.

With the development of automation technology, ship manning requirements are
decreasing. In the foreseeable future, ships will become more automated, and some
even believe that the large-scale application of unmanned ships will become a reality.
The impact of these technological developments on human factors is also worth
exploring in depth.

Last but not least, the global Covid-19 epidemic that started in late 2019 still shows
no signs of ending after a year and a half, but has already had a serious impact on the
shipping industry. In particular, it has had a huge negative impact on crew members
both physically and psychologically that cannot be ignored. This may also make the
human factors of maritime accidents more complex, which will be analyzed in this
paper.
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2

Ship Collision Accidents in China

Before analyzing the ship collision accidents, it is necessary to make a brief
introduction to this topic, and understand the definition and the process of the
occurrence of the ship collision accidents. Since the study of this paper is based on
the investigation reports of ship collisions, it is also necessary to elaborate on the
accident investigation and investigation reports. The paper examines ship accidents
within Chinese jurisdiction, using the definition and understanding of those accidents
by Chinese laws, regulations, authorities, and researchers.

2.1

Definition of ship collision accidents

There are a variety of definitions for ship collisions provided by different scholars.
Ship collisions may occur between ships and ships, or between ships and other
floating or fixed objects, such as icebergs, offshore platforms, bridges, whales, etc.
This study focuses on ship-ship collisions. Chinese scholars Si & Wu (1995) defined
the broad concept of ship collision in their book Ship Collision Law: ship collision in
the broad sense refers to mutual contact between ships resulting in damage to one or
both parties. Zhao & Wang (1995) defined ship collision as an accident in which a
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ship collides or touches another ship while sailing or at berth, causing damage to the
ship. In Chinese maritime law, a ship collision is an accident in which a ship comes
into contact (with other ships) at sea or in navigable waters connected to the sea,
causing damage.

Figure 3 - A ship-ship collision accident: a Tunisian vessel carrying trucks rammed
into another ship off Corsica in clear conditions in October 2018.
Source: Associated Press

Based on the above definitions, the following three conditions are necessary to
constitute a ship collision in Chinese law and practice.
(1) The subjects in the accident must be ships. In other words, the collision
must occur between two ships. A collision with the port, reef, iceberg, or any other
non-ship subject cannot be considered a ship collision accident. According to the
regulation, no matter the ship is in navigation or at berth, it should keep normal
watch, indicating that the subject in the ship collision accident should have the ability
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to actively identify the collision hazard and take collision avoidance measures in
time.
(2) There is direct physical contact. It means that at the time of the accident part
of both vessels occupied the same physical space (see Figure 3). It excludes the case
when the waves raised by the ship acted as a force for causing damage to other ships,
but the ships did not make direct contact with one another.
(3) Damage has indeed been caused. The occurrence of a collision causes
damage to both vessels in the accident or to a single party, resulting in economic loss,
human casualties, environmental pollution and other consequences. If there is only
physical contact between ships but no damage is done, it is not considered a
collision.

All of the ship collisions studied in this paper meet the above three conditions.

2.2 Process of ship collision accidents

There are four stages to the process of ship collisions, according to the actions that
are permitted or required by each ship (Zhao & Wang, 1995).
Stage 1: Free movement. At this point, the two ships are far apart and there is no
danger of collision. The action rules related to collision avoidance are not yet
applicable, and the vessels are free to act without restraint. In practice, at this stage
two ships usually do not take collision avoidance action, but if it is expected that they
may encounter a difficult situation of avoidance, some ship pilots will also take
appropriate action at this stage, which is worth considering.
Stage 2: Collision hazard. Generally speaking, when the Distance of Closest
Point of Approaching (DCPA) of two ships is less than the safe meeting distance,
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and the Time to Closest Point of Approaching (TCPA) is limited, there is a danger of
collision between two ships. At this stage, one of the vessels has the duty and
responsibility to give way to the other vessel according to the collision avoidance
rules. In this stage, according to the rules, the give-way vessel's avoidance action
should be carried out early and should be substantial to keep well clear. The other
vessel should maintain her course and speed according to the rules.
Stage 3: Close-quarters situation. When the action of the give-way vessel alone
cannot ensure that the two vessels are sailing at a safe distance, it is considered that
the two vessels are in a close-quarters situation. In practice, a close-quarters situation
is often caused by the failure of the give-way vessel to take timely and effective
action in accordance with the requirements of the rules at the collision hazard stage.
Stage 4: Immediate danger. When the two ships are so close that the collision
cannot be avoided by the action of the give-way ship alone, or so close that the action
of the two ships cannot keep clear at a safe distance, it is considered that the two
ships are in the stage of immediate danger. At this point, the two vessels should take
advantage of every opportunity to avoid collision. If it is impossible to avoid
collision, they should take the necessary measures in order to reduce the damage
from collision. Of course, the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea 1972 (COLREGs) also provides that, in construing and complying with its Rules
dueregard shall be had to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any
special circumstances, including the limitations of the vessels involved, which max,
make a departure from its Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger.

Under normal circumstances, when two ships are about to meet at sea, the
watchkeepers of both ships should have proper situation awareness, assess the danger
of collision, communicate on collision avoidance actions, and take appropriate
avoidance actions in time to keep clear of each other. If one or more of the links fails
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in this process and is not corrected in time, it may eventually result in an accident.
Figure 4 illustrates how an individual ship collides or avoids a collision with another
ship.

Figure 4 - The simplified process of a ship collision accident.
Source: adapted from Zheng (2000).

According to the above description of ship collisions, the most practical way to
prevent collisions is to cut off the links that lead to them. According to Zhao and
Wang (1995), there are a few steps one can take to avoid a ship collision.
(1) Observe and perceive other ships, and gather information.
(2) Determine the risk of a collision.
(3) Determine whether avoidance action are needed.
(4) Decide on avoidance actions and timing.
(5) Take proper collision avoidance actions.
(6) Resumption of navigation.

This requires the ship's watchkeepers to keep regular lookout as required by the rules,
so as to observe the other ship early when the ships meet, including the perception of
the other ship through visual and acoustic senses, as well as the information of the
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other ship's course, speed and bearing obtained by using radar, AIS and other
navigation aids. Based on these information, both ships analyze the encounter
situation, accurately calculate the DCPA and TCPA of the two ships, and then judge
whether there is a danger of collision. If there is a real danger of collision, they
should communicate and coordinate the collision avoidance actions according to the
requirements of collision avoidance rules, and take effective actions as early as
possible, until finally sailing through to keep each other clear, and then return to the
planned routes. Even if there is no danger of collision between the two vessels,
watchkeepers should also pay attention to the environment around their own ships
and the planned routes.

2.3 Investigation reports of ship collision accidents

A ship collision accident investigation report is a conclusive report based on the
thorough investigation of the accident by the professional investigators of the
Maritime Authorities following the collision accident. An accident investigation
report should include an overview of the accident and investigation, the ship, crew,
and cargo profiles, the navigation environment and ship's situation, details of the
accident, rescue and salvage, damage and loss, accident causality analysis, and
advice on safety management(see Figure 5).
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Figure 5 - Main contents of a ship collision investigation report in China.

The following is a brief description of the eight elements of China's maritime
accident investigation report:
(1) Overview of the accident and investigation. A brief description of the
accident including time, location, ships involved, consequences of the accident, main
causes, etc. The investigation overview includes the organization involved in the
investigation (e.g. Maritime Authorities), the accident investigation method
(questioning of parties, access to records and documentation, etc.), and the
investigation target (crew member, shipping companies, etc.).
(2) Ship, crew and cargo profiles. The ship profile includes the type, tonnage,
main engine and other information of the ship, and the ship's manning, including the
minimum safety manning requirements that the ship should meet according to the
rules and the actual manning of the ship at the time of the incident, the number
qualification of crew members. The cargo profile includes whether the type of cargo
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carried by the ship matches with the type of ship, whether the ship is overloaded, and
whether the cargo is reasonably loaded and whether effective safety protection
measures are taken for special cargo, such as dangerous goods.
(3) Navigational environment and ship's status. The navigational environment
includes hydro-meteorological conditions (wind, waves, currents, visibility, etc.), as
well as the channel conditions around the location of the accident and nearby waters,
such as traffic density, channel width, channel depth, islands, shoals, reefs and other
conditions. Ship's status includes ship's certificate, survey and inspection history, and
the ship's equipment and facilities, as well as the ship’s operator/owner.
(4) Details of the accident. The detailed descriptions of the accident that are
established by investigators based on the statements of the crews, AIS, VDR,
shore-based radar data, VHF recordings, etc. The accident is often recorded in the
report in chronological order, starting from the start of the voyage of the two ships to
the end of the collision, elaborating the implementation of navigation plan and
watchkeeping, navigation methods, communication between vessels, collision
avoidance actions and emergency measures taken by both vessels during this period.
(5) Rescue and salvage. This describes the distress information received by the
search and rescue center after the collision, the situation of self-rescue by the
involving vessels, rescue team’s efforts, and the final result of rescue (including the
rescue of personnel and salvage of the wreck, etc.).
(6) Accident damage and loss. The casualties and missing persons in the
accident, the economic loss caused by the damage of the ship/equipment and the
loss/damage of cargo, the environmental pollution caused by the oil spill and the
leakage of harmful substances.
(7) Accident causality analysis. The conclusion given by the professional
accident investigation team to synthesize all aspects of the information of the
collision. The purpose of the report to analyze the cause of the accident is not to
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pursue responsibility, but to summarize the experience and lessons, and help to avoid
the occurrence of similar collisions in the future. The causes of accidents are often
divided into two categories: direct causes and indirect causes, where direct causes
generally include the decision errors of the ships leading to the collision, including
improper collision avoidance actions, etc, which are often obvious and easier to
identify. Indirect causes mainly include training of crew members, management
loopholes of shipping companies, etc., which are often more complex to identify.
(8) Advice or recommendations on safety management. Recommendations and
advice provided to the parties involved in the accident in order to avoid the
recurrence of similar accidents.

An investigation report is an authoritative and comprehensive data source for the
study of ship collisions. Many researchers have conducted corresponding studies
based on such data, and many results have been obtained in constructing causal
models of ship collisions and tracing a causal chain. However, the current research
on human factors in ship collisions mostly focuses on the specific collision
avoidance behaviors and the objective navigation environment in the accident
investigation report, without paying special attention to other parts. HFACS was used
in this paper in order to delve deeper into the information in each part of the ship
collision investigation report,

including the sections

about organizational

influence and supervision factors.

2.4 Chapter summary

The chapter describes the definition, mechanism, and process of ship collisions, as
well as contents of the accident investigation reports, according to the Chinese
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regulations, authorities, and researchers' understanding of ship collisions. As a result,
a solid foundation is established for further analysis of human factors in ship
collision accidents based on accident investigation reports.
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3

3.1

Human Factors in Ship Collision Accidents

The HFACS model

The HFACS model emerged from the field of aviation safety. At the end of the
twentieth century, aircraft themselves were quite reliable and humans themselves had
become an important factor in flight accidents. More and more aviation safety
researchers began to study human error in flight accidents. This has led to a variety
of human error analysis models and corresponding human error investigation
programs. Douglas A. Wiegmann and Scott A. Shappell summarized and analyzed
six previous perspectives that have been proposed to study human factors in flight
accidents, and found that most of these perspectives were not supported by theory
and data, but were proposed based on intuition. Consequently, models based on these
perspectives are either too simplistic to analyze hidden factors in depth or too
abstract to be understood, let alone used in practical investigations (Wiegmann &
Shappell, 2000). Therefore they revised James Reason's model of accident causation
theory (i.e., the Swiss Cheese Model), and based on this model they extracted the
human factors in a large number of aircraft accident reports, comprehensively
analyzed the deep-seated causes of accidents, and reasonably classified each layer of
factors into specific categories, and then proposed the HFACS model. The generation
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of this model provides a practical tool for the investigation and analysis of human
factors in flight accidents, and also provides a reference for the expansion of human
factors research into other areas.

HFACS is based on the Swiss Cheese Model and defines the "holes" in the "cheese"
in detail, so that the abstract concept is expressed as a concrete and specific content.
It divides accident-causing factors into four levels of failure, namely, the
organizational influence level, the unsafe supervision level, the preconditions for
unsafe acts level, and the unsafe acts level. To further clarify the attribution of each
factor, in practical application HFACS also lists the specific content of each
subcategory. For example, the category of inadequate supervision under the unsafe
supervision level includes failure to track qualifications and performance, failure to
provide guidance and oversight. These detailed definitions and categories provide a
convenient and practical way for researchers and investigators to conduct accident
investigations quickly and accurately, and also provide a reference for applying
HFACS to the study of human factors in other areas.

It is safe to argue that HFACS is one of the most mature methods for human factor
analysis and classification, and has achieved many good results in practical
applications. Some scholars have combined the characteristics of their respective
research fields and made appropriate modifications to HFACS, which makes this
model effectively applied in a wider range of fields, including in ship collision
accidents. There are a large number of similarities between maritime traffic and air
traffic, as well as between ship collisions and aircraft collisions. The following
paragraphs describe five similarities:

２５

(1) The operators of both aircraft and ships are highly specialized, with high
requirements for skills, and strict standard regulations for operators’ education,
training, and qualification assessment and certification.
(2) The supporting navigation instruments and equipment on board are abundant
and complex. With the development of science and technology and the increasing
attention to safety, more and more advanced instruments and equipment are
integrated into ships and aircraft to assist the pilot to maneuver and improve the
safety level of the system, but this also further increases the requirements for the
pilot's capacity.
(3) Merchant ships and aircraft are often used for long-distance transportation,
have fixed routes, and are prone to accidents due to the relatively heavy traffic flow
at the end of the voyage and at certain convergence points. On most of their routes,
traffic is sparse, so pilots/captains often use automatic piloting during this phase.
(4) Unlike road transportation, ships and aircraft encounter collisions relatively
less; but when they do, the resulting damage is often huge. Detailed voyage plans are
made before the voyage begins. Weather conditions play a huge role in the
occurrence of a ship/aircraft accident. Traffic control agencies and the operating
companies of ships and aircraft have a greater impact on the occurrence of accidents.
(5) The investigation following an accident is done by professionals, resulting in
a report that provides all relevant data and causes of the accident. These accident
investigation reports also serve as a valuable data source for research and provide
lessons learned to prevent recurrence of similar accidents.

Of course, in addition to the similarities listed above, we should also continue to
analyze the differences between ship collisions and aircraft collisions in order to
reach a comprehensive understanding, these include five aspects:
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(1) Speed. The sailing speed of a ship is much slower than an aircraft's flight
speed. As for the collision, the ship sailing at sea can be considered a
two-dimensional plane movement,

and the aircraft flying in the air is a

three-dimensional movement. The ship can reduce its speed to zero or reverse its
course during navigation, while the aircraft cannot. Moreover, large ships are less
capable of changing speed direction, and airplanes are more maneuverable in this
regard.
(2) Space. When a ship is moving on the surface of the sea, if its speed is 0, the
ship can stay on the surface of the sea by virtue of the buoyancy of the sea without
accident, while the aircraft cannot reduce its speed to zero while flying.
(3) The role of traffic control agencies. For the role of traffic control agencies in
the collision avoidance process, it’s less important in the ship collision avoidance
process. While traffic control may remind ships of their situation and the
environment, the coordination of avoidance action and the specific collision
avoidance maneuvers are at the discretion of the ship's pilot based on the actual
situation. When a plane is in danger of colliding in the air, traffic control gives more
frequent and specific instructions.
(4) Results of collision accident and rescue. In the event of a ship collision
accident, if the speed is low and the damage is not severe, the ship can be repaired by
itself or sailed to a safe position with the assistance of tugboats. In spite of serious
consequences like sinking, it is generally possible to reduce collision losses by
starting the emergency plan to organize the crew and passengers on board to escape
through lifeboats, allowing them to be rescued by nearby ships or rescuers. However,
once aircraft collide, the final result is often the total destruction of the aircraft, often
with no survivors.
(5) Accident investigation. In light of the above differences, when examining a
ship collision, the information that can be referred to is not only that provided by the
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ship's VDR, AIS, and other instruments and equipment, but also that provided by
the survivors of the accident. In contrast, the investigation of aircraft collisions, in
most cases, does not have the opportunity to interview survivors since few people
survive a collision.

Based on the above comparison of ship collisions and airplane collisions, it is
reasonable to introduce the HFACS model, which is well established in
aviation accident research, when studying the causes of ship collisions. To obtain a
HFACS model that is applicable to ship collisions, it needs to be modified with the
specific characteristics of ship collisions.

3.2

Analyzing human factors in ship collision accidents with HFACS

The human factor or the human element is a complex multidimensional issue that
affects maritime safety, security and marine environmental protection and involves
the full range of human activities performed by ship's crew, shore-based managers,
regulators and others (International Maritime Organization, 2021). In the maritime
context, the term "human factor" includes anything that affects the interaction
between a person and any other person, system or machine on board. The HFACS
framework breaks down the factors that affect maritime safety at four levels:
organizational influences, unsafe supervisions, preconditions for unsafe acts and
unsafe acts. Some researchers add to these four categories a fifth top-most level
named "Outside Factors", which includes the regulatory environment as well as the
economic, political, social, and legal environments (Chauvin et al., 2013). The author
of this paper believes that such a level is not essential for the study of human factors
and therefore excludes it from the discussion.
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Based on the previous research findings and the analysis of ship collision accident
investigation reports, the authors carefully reviewed the 21 reports collected,
identified nearly all the human factors involved in the accidents, and classified them
according to the HFACS framework.

3.2.1 Organizational influences

Organizational influences are implicit factors of ship collision accidents, which
mainly result from the failures or defects of shipping companies and crew
management companies in the process of managing ships and crew for the purpose of
preventing accidents and ensuring safety and environmental protection. The
organizational influence level has 3 categories of factors, which are resource
management, organizational climate, and organizational processes, as shown in the
Figure 6.

Figure 6- Human factors at the Organizational influences level.
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Resource management is the process of allocating and organizing resources such as
crew, training, finance, equipment, etc. throughout the course of a ship's operation.
Resource In the shrinking shipping market, especially during downturns, resource
management is often faced with the conflict between safety and profit. In that case, it
is easy to compromise on safety in order to reach profit. This category includes the
following three factors.
A. Insufficient manning. According to regulations, the minimum safe manning
requirements of a ship shall be sufficient to ensure the safe navigation, berthing and
operation of the ship and prevent the ship from polluting the environment. The
minimum safe manning shall be adapted to the type and main engine power of the
ship. When the actual manning on board does not meet the requirements of the Ship's
Minimum Safe Manning Certificate or its equivalent documents held by the ship, it is
regarded as insufficient manning. Furthermore, the ship can add additional crew
members if necessary, but not more than the authorized manning standard for
life-saving equipment.
B. Inadequate training. A shipping company should provide sufficient training
to the crew before them work on board a ship, including theoretical knowledge and
practical operation, in order to ensure that they are competent to perform the tasks on
board. The training provided should meet the requirements of STCW Convention or
other domestic regulations. Nevertheless, some shipping companies in reality reduce
or cancel crew training due to short crew schedule cycles, which negatively impacts
the safe operation of ships.
C. Inadequate equipment, facility and financial support. The ships put into
operation by the shipping company are either not built to standards or later appear
unsuitable for further use. This includes the ship's hull structure, power equipment,
navigation systems, and sound and light signals. In order to increase the revenue, a
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ship company may cut the capital that should have been invested by reducing the
crew, lowering the training time and shortening the inter-voyage cycle. The
profit-centered operation ideology is evident in many aspects of the accident
investigation despite not being identified in the accident investigation.

Organizational climate in this context refers to the working atmosphere within the
organization, including culture, policy and command structure, which can also be
considered as the working atmosphere of the personnel involved in the ship operation
process. These factors include the inadequate work done by the shipping company in
setting up a safety culture and raising the safety awareness of employees, including
not conducting sufficient safety training and not following through with promoting
safety knowledge. The value of safety first is not established when interests and
safety conflict. Moreover, there are deficiencies in administrative management, such
as in the management of personnel files, recruitment, training, and assessment, as
well as unreasonable delegation of authority relating to safety

issues in vessel

operations. In addition, there is poor information communication, especially when it
comes to transferring information about navigation safety between the upper and
lower management levels at a shipping company as well as between the company
and the ship, including planning voyages, senior crew scheduling, and special
situation notices.

Organizational process refers to a series of administrative decisions and rules formed
by the shipping company in implementing the ship safety management system,
including the development of standard operating procedures involving ship safety,
the management and assessment of crew work, etc. These factors include an
incomplete safety management system. A shipping company's safety management
system should include these elements: safety and environmental protection policy,
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instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of the ship and environmental
protection in accordance with relevant international and flag state legislation,
authority of ship and shore personnel and channels of communication between them,
reporting procedures for accidents and non-compliance with rules, internal review
and management audit procedures. If the safety management system does not meet
these requirements, it will pose a hidden risk to the safe operation of the ship.

3.2.2 Unsafe supervision

The human factors at the unsafe supervision level are also implicit in the HAFACS
framework and include four main categories: inadequate supervision, planned
inappropriate operations, failure to correct problems, and supervisory violations, as
shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7 - Human factors at the Unsafe Supervision level.

Inadequate supervision. Supervisors in the safe operation of ships mainly include
shore-based management supervision and master supervision. Whenever supervision
and inspection are not conducted according to the appropriate procedures, the
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possibility of detecting safety problems may be lost, which adversely affects the
ship's safety. Factors in this category are specifically defined below.
A. Failure to track qualifications and performance. Before recruiting crew
members and placing them on board, shipping companies do not verify their
competency certificates or do not confirm their skill levels according to the job
requirements. Crew certificates of competency have expired, there are mismatches
between the individual and the certificate, and the holder of the certificate does not
meet the requirements of the actual vessel's navigational zone. Also, crew on LNG
vessels, tankers, etc. do not obtain the required additional certificates. The ship's
master does not monitor the work or performance of the crew.
B. Failure to provide guidance and oversight. This includes not providing the
operating vessel with appropriate publications (e.g. charts, route guides, port guides,
sailing notices, etc.) by the shipping company and the master. Procedures and rules
are not provided or are inadequate. Crew members' behavior on board must be
guided by various safety operation rules and procedures involved in shipboard
operations. A complete set of operation rules and procedures can help new crew
members become familiar with the operations on board as soon as possible. The staff
will be more likely to skip some steps in order to save time if the shipping company
does not provide appropriate operating rules and procedures or does not provide
them adequately. Failure to monitor the crew's work implementation.
C. Failure to identify and control risk. Risk factors affecting navigational
safety, such as defects in documentation, crew training, a ship's seaworthiness, etc.,
that cannot be identified and controlled in a timely manner.

Planned inappropriate operations refers to a situation where a ship is exposed to risks
due to a lack of adequate and reasonable consideration beforehand, leading to an
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unsafe plan. Such factors include improper crew scheduling, and an inappropriate
operation plan and mission.
A. Improper crew scheduling. Proper crew scheduling differs from the above
two factors of insufficient crew and the lack of assessment of crew's capability,
which is the deployment of crew members without considering the integration of
new crew members with the existing crew or not allocating the work in accordance
with the crew's

qualification. As an example, a crew member who did not speak

English well was assigned to work on a ship with all crew members
speaking

English, and a mechanic was assigned to watchkeeping. Or fail to

schedule crew rest and work hours appropriately.
B. Inappropriate operation plan and mission. The navigation and operation plan
should take into account the ship's condition, cargo conditions, hydro-meteorological
conditions near the route, port traffic conditions, and choose the appropriate route,
speed, and time to reach the key route points and ports in accordance with the
principle of both safety and economy. When plans are too oriented toward economic
efficiency and benefits, safety may be compromised and accidents more likely to
occur.

Failure to correct known problems. Not reporting unsafe trends is part of this. Those
situations that already exist or that will occur and are detrimental to the safe
operation of the ship should be brought to the attention of the shipping company and
the ship's personnel in time to prevent or minimize the damage. In the absence of
corrective action, these risks may continue to increase. Specifically, these situations
consist of a failure to discover certain behaviors or events that may have a negative
impact on a ship's safety, or noticing problems but not taking action to address them
as soon as possible.
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Supervisory violations are more serious than inadequate supervision category.
Inadequate supervision occurs when the supervision is not in place or details are
missed due to negligence, while supervision violations are behaviour done despite
knowing that they are against the rules, especially the safety management system.

3.2.3 Preconditions for unsafe acts

The level of preconditions for unsafe acts has three categories: environmental factors,
condition of operators, and personnel factors. These factors explain the causes of
unsafe acts, and there are both implicit and explicit factors at this level(see Figure 8)

Figure 8 - Human factors at the Preconditions For Unsafe Acts level.
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Environmental factors include the physical environment and the technological
environment. Physical environments include wind, waves, visibility, lighting,
channel conditions, and traffic density. Lookout and collision hazard judgment can
be affected or limited by fog, night, and external lights. Ships' safe passage will be
affected by the width of the channel, water depth, traffic density, and the condition of
lighthouses, buoys, and other navigation aids. In narrow channels, vessel
maneuverability can be greatly restricted by these factors, especially when collision
avoidance is required. The technological environment is mainly the problem of
defective design and construction of the ship and the bridge, or the failure of the
equipment and facilities equipped by the ship that do not meet the safety standards.
The performance of a ship's main engine, rudder, anchor, and other equipment affects
the ship's speed and effectiveness when taking collision avoidance measures.
Ship-to-ship communication and coordination depend on reliable communication
equipment. In the aftermath of a ship accident, fire-fighting and life-saving
equipment play a big role in damage prevention. Moreover, the nature of the cargo
and the loading condition of the ship also contribute to the safety of the vessel.

Condition of operators refers to the mental and physical state of the crew, as well as
their ability and experience. A crew member in poor condition may not be able to
take full and proper collision avoidance action. This includes poor mental state,
adverse physiological state, fatigue, and physical/mental limitations.
A. Adverse mental state. Loss of situation awareness, mental fatigue, attention
deficits, circadian rhythm disorders, and complacency are all adverse mental
conditions that disrupt one's performance.
B. Adverse physiological state. A performance-impacting physiological,
pharmacological, or medical abnormality. A crew member who is fatigued due to
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excessive work intensity, insufficient rest periods, etc., will not be physically able to
perform the tasks of their normal shift.
C. Physical/mental limitations. These include situations where individuals do
not have the knowledge, ability, skills or time to process information safely. For
instance, when a ship sails along a new route, the crew may be inexperienced in
understanding the risks associated with the route.

Personnel factors include inter-ship communication, bridge resource management
(BRM), and personal readiness failures
A. Inter-ship communication. Communication is a prerequisite for accurate
information transmission. A ship's failure to communicate with other ships, as well
as with shore, can adversely affect its safety. It is impossible to understand the
intention of the other ship when communication is nonexistent or ineffective.
B. Bridge Resource Management. BRM is the responsible operation of a ship
based on effective utilization, application, and coordination of all the available
human resources and technologies, together with the skills and experience of the
bridge team. In ship collisions, lack of timely reporting, lack of teamwork, and a lack
of effective communication are the main human factors involved.
C. Personal readiness failures. This occurs when individuals are not physically
or mentally prepared for the task, for instance, violation of crew rest requirements,
excessive physical training, self-medication, and being under the influence of
alcohol.
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3.2.4 Unsafe acts

Unsafe acts are the explicit factor level of the HFACS framework that often leads
directly to an incident or makes the consequences of one more severe, and includes
skill-based errors, decision errors, perception errors, and violations(see Figure 9).

Figure 9 - Human factors at the Unsafe Acts level.

There are three kinds of errors.
A. Skill-based errors occur with little or no conscious thought. They are
associated with automatic behavior. An example could be an inadvertent activation
of the rudder on a vessel.
B. Decision errors are conscious, purposeful decisions to carry out an action as
designed, however, the actions are not appropriate for the situation. It includes errors
in deciding the course and speed of the ship as well as errors in deciding what to do
when the ship encounters a special situation. For example, avoiding collisions is not
appropriate in a dangerous situation. Or the emergency measures taken in the case of
a collision are ineffective, resulting in the accident causing more damage. As an
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example, when the bow of one ship crashes into the cabin of another, causing the
latter cabin to break, the former immediately reverses and backs up, causing seawater
to quickly fill the cabin, causing the latter ship to capsize.
C. Perceptual errors refer to the situation where the pilot on watch does not
perceive the other vessel or perceives it too late. It may be that the pilot does not
maintain a regular lookout or is restricted by other factors, such as low visibility or
vessels near the route not turning on their navigation lights at

night. Wrong

judgment of collision hazards, including errors in the pilot's judgment based on the
current course and speed of own vessel and other vessels, and errors in anticipating
the dynamics of own vessel and other vessels and resulting in collision hazards.

Violations are acts of willful disregard for regulations, and they can be divided into
routine violations and exceptional violations.

3.3

Case study

In this section, based on the HFACS model, a case study of human factors was
performed by drawing data from 21 collision investigation reports in China in the
year 2020, which were publicly available on the China Maritime Safety
Administration website (China Maritime Safety Administration, 2021). The factors
involved in each collision for both vessels were classified and counted, and the
results are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1- Distribution of human factors in 21 maritime collision incidents, according
to investigation reports.
Number of reports where
the factor is mentioned
and percentage, N=21
Organizational Influences

14 (66.67%)

Resource Management

12 (57.14%)

Insufficient manning

9 (42.86%)

Inadequate training

4 (19.05%)

Inadequate equipment, facility and financial support
Organizational Climate

0
0

Organizational Process (incomplete SMS)
Unsafe Supervisions

3 (14.29%)
13 (61.90%)

Inadequate Supervision

6 (28.57%)

Failure to track qualifications and performance

3 (14.29%)

Failure to provide guidance and oversight

1 (4.76%)

Failure to identify and control risk

2 (9.52%)

Planned Inappropriate Operations

6 (28.57%)

Improper crew scheduling

3 (14.29%)

Inappropriate operation plan and mission

3 (14.29%)

Failed to Correct Known Problems

1 (4.76%)

Supervisory Violations (non-compliance with SMS)

6 (28.57%)

Preconditions For Unsafe Acts

17 (80.95%)

Environmental Factors

16 (76.19%)

Physical environment

12 (57.14%)

Wind, visibility or lighting

2 (9.52%)
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Channel conditions and traffic density
Technological environment

10 (47.62%)
4 (19.05%)

Ship and bridge defects, equipment failure

4 (19.05%)

Condition of Operators

3 (14.29%)

Adverse mental state

1 (4.76%)

Adverse physiological state, including fatigue

2 (9.52%)

Physical/mental limitations

0

Personnel Factors

7 (33.33%)

Inter-ship communication

4 (19.05%)

Bridge resource management (BRM)

3 (14.29%)

Personal readiness failures

0

Unsafe Acts

21 (100%)

Skill-Based Errors

3 (14.29%)

Decision Errors

18 (85.71%)

Perceptual Errors

10 (47.62%)

Violations

4 (19.05%)

Analysis of the data in Table 1 shows that the majority of accidents involve human
factors at all four levels: organizational influences (66.67%), unsafe supervisions
(61.90%), preconditions for unsafe acts (80.95%), and unsafe acts (100%). Every
accident report mentions unsafe acts since they are the direct causes of the accidents
and are the ones investigators focus on when doing investigations. According to the
HFACS model, unsafe acts are the last barrier to prevent collisions between ships,
and once this layer is breached, collisions cannot be prevented. Unsafe acts include
errors and violations. Only a minority of accidents are caused by violations (19.05%).
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Most incidents are directly caused by errors, particularly decision errors (85.71%)
and perceptual errors (47.62%). Perceptual errors are mainly a failure of situation
awareness, where crew members do not perceive other vessels early enough due to
poor lookout, until it is too late to act to avoid a collision. Therefore, the key to
preventing accidents is to help crew members manage and control errors.

Preconditions for unsafe acts were cited in 17 of 21 incidents (80.95%), 16 of which
involved environmental factors. The most common environmental factors are
complicated channel conditions and high traffic density, as ten incidents are
associated with these conditions. The challenge for the authorities is to improve the
conditions of the waterways, and to ensure that a large number of vessels in limited
waters can navigate safely.

At the level of unsafe supervisions, improper crew scheduling, inappropriate
operation plan and mission, violations of SMS were the causal factors for a few
incidents, each were mentioned in 6 investigation reports. In order to reduce the
impact of these factors, the shore-based management of the shipping company and
the captain of the ship will have to do a better job of supervising on board.

Organizational influences were mentioned in 14 incidents, 12 of which were related
to resource management. Inadequate manning was a prominent issue, with 9 of the
21 ship collision accidents affected by this factor, including insufficient crew
numbers and crew members not holding the proper certificates of competency. The
majority of these situations are caused by shipping companies' cost-cutting efforts.
To reduce this irresponsible behavior that threatens maritime safety, punitive
measures should be taken against these companies. This will have a deterrent effect
and increase the cost of their violations.

４２

3.4

Chapter summary

The chapter reviews the history of the HFACS framework, which is an effective
method to analyze human factors in aviation safety. In light of the similarities
between the maritime and aviation industries, it is feasible, appropriate, and
beneficial to use the HFACS framework in maritime safety incident analysis, once
appropriate modifications are made. The specific causes of maritime accidents are
examined at four levels: organizational influences,unsafe supervisions, preconditions
for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts, which are further illustrated by a case study of 21
ship collision investigation reports. In this case study, human factors distribution was
quantified at each of the levels of the HFACS model, to show how many incidents
were caused by each factor.
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4

4.1

Addressing Human Factors

A systemic problem

Human factors are responsible for the majority of maritime accidents. It is essential
to address human factors and reduce human errors in order to reduce accidents,
protect human life and property, and protect the marine environment. Human
factors/errors can be addressed in two different ways: the person approach and the
system approach. A person approach focuses on the mistakes made by individuals,
blaming them for forgetfulness, inattention, or moral weakness. A system approach,
on the other hand, involves building defenses against errors or mitigating their
impact by addressing the conditions under which people operate. Rather than change
the human condition, countermeasures are based on the assumption that conditions in
which humans work can be changed (Reason, 2000).

A primary way to minimize the negative impact of human factors is to improve the
working conditions of crews. Nevertheless, improving crew working conditions is
not as simple as it may seem, since this is a structural issue. The International
Maritime Organization, for example, has tools to reduce crew fatigue and protect
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seafarers from overwork. Resolution A.772(18) addresses fatigue factors in manning
and safety, while Resolution A.1047(27) integrates three core concepts for fatigue
mitigation. The IMO fatigue guidelines came into effect in 2019. In addition, ILO
Convention No. 180, adopted in 1996, sets mandatory standards for minimum and
maximum working hours. However, this issue has yet to be resolved due to the
following six deep-rooted issues:
(1) A problematic maritime culture. In this culture, priority is given to keeping
the ship running. In order to maximize every penny invested in their ships, managers
on shore often expect seafarers to work until work is done, even if crews are
exhausted. Charterers are also keen to have their influence exerted so that ships run
on time, regardless of weather or emergency. There is also the problem of
six-on/six-off watch schedules, without effective regulations on rest hours, unlike
other industries. This is not only a problem of regulation, but also a problem of
culture.
(2) Culture of adjustment. Seafarers often lack the rest time they need on board
although regulators and inspectors try to make sure they do so, as a result of a
“culture of adjustment", under which a large number of seafarers tamper with their
work and rest records to avoid non-compliance in official inspections (Baumler et al.,
2021). Due to employment concerns and job insecurity, seafarers are subject to this
"adjustment culture" because they have no other choice. The current regulatory
framework does not address the fact that rules and regulations are only followed on
paper. The port states and flag states are well aware of the problem, but inspectors
rarely assess the accuracy of records. Even when they wish to verify rest time, they
lack a robust process compared to their robust ability to assess the accuracy of other
records, such as oil

records. It is difficult to ignore the systemic failures in the

implementation of regulations related to work/rest time.

４５

(3) Changes in the shipping industry. Ships are becoming larger and more
complex, and more operations are being automated. But it also leads to the ironies of
automation: automation technology was thought to be able to do the job better than
humans, so it was developed and adopted. Ironically, automation requires human
monitoring to ensure that the system is doing its job correctly (Baxter et al., 2012).
The physical work of the crew may be reduced due to automation, but it requires
more monitoring of equipment and systems, as well as requiring concentration for
longer periods of time. The result is a greater likelihood of mental fatigue. Moreover,
the number of crew members on ships has sharply decreased, from hundreds in times
of sailing ships and steam ships to only about 25 on modern ships due to
technological advances, including containerization. Having fewer deck officers on
watch will result in longer hours and fatigue.
(4) Shortened port turnaround. Port time has been reduced dramatically in the
past decades, from 2 to 4 weeks in port to less than 24 hours, mainly due to
containerization. As a result, the crew no longer has as much time as they once did to
go ashore and relax while the ship is docked.
(5) Open registry. To reduce cost and maximize profit, shipowners tend to
register their ships in open registry countries due to their lax laws on safety and
working conditions for crews, and a lack of protection of crew rights.
(6) Supply chain pressure. Although it was expected that pressure from supply
chain would improve working conditions for crews, the opposite has occurred.
Tanker operators and managers often request that their crews work longer hours in
exchange for approval of compliance by Oil Majors such as Shell, Texaco, and
Exxon (Bhattacharya & Tang, 2012).

These problems result from the fact that modern shipping companies are a top-down
structure, in which the crew can only accept decisions, requests and instructions from
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management, without any right or ability to participate. Crew members do not even
dare raise their concerns about unreasonable orders with the company for fear of
losing their contracts. In order to solve the issues mentioned above, the power
structure needs to be changed so that crew members may bargain collectively and
participate in decisions that affect their interests.

4.2

Technology and human factors

The study by Hanzu-Pazara et al. (2008) shows that simulation, modeling and
web-based simulation training can reduce human factor-caused accidents at sea by
improving crew capabilities, and ensuring that innovation delivers on its promise of
improved activity. In addition, the authors recognize that, while automation can help
operators of complex systems to reduce workloads or free up resources for other
tasks, it also can cause problems for the control of the system, since it increases risks
of unintentional human errors leading to accidents at sea.

The development of technology cannot eliminate the human element. Design,
development, operation, and maintenance of technical systems all require humans. At
present, unmanned ships still seem to be a distant reality. Even if they become
widely used in the future and do not have any crew on board, a large number of
system operators will still be required on shore. Wahlström et al. (2015) argued that
unmanned operations of vessels face many of the same challenges as those of
aviation, subways, space stations, and other industries. The need for human
understanding in local knowledge and object differentiation (e.g., differentiate
between help-seekers and pirates), and the information overload and boredom,
mishap during changeovers and handoffs are a few examples. To achieve the goals of
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safer shipping and better working conditions for crew, the application of technology
in the design, construction and operation of ships must be human-centered
(Praetorius et al., 2015).

4.3

Impact of Covid-19 pandemic

More than a year and a half after the COVID-19 pandemic began, there is still no end
in sight. One of the groups most affected by the outbreak is seafarers, who risk
contracting the Coronavirus while carrying food, clothing, electronics and more
around the world. However, due to closed borders, travel restrictions, and quarantine
policies implemented by countries to stop the virus spreading, crew changes have
become very difficult, or even impossible. As a result, roughly tens of thousands of
seafarers are stuck on board ships and have to work much longer than their contracts
require them. In many cases, shore leaves have also been denied, leaving crew
members unable to purchase supplies and seek dental/medical services. Crew
members are very exhausted and under great stress due to long and extended
contracts. Not only the crew members are facing a physical and mental health crisis,
the chances of maritime accidents caused by human errors have also increased
greatly.

For the sustainable development of the shipping industry and for the recovery of the
world economy, governments, international organizations and shipping companies
around the world must protect crews. Most important is to make crew changes
possible in as many countries as possible, so that seafarers can leave ships and return
to their families. To make this happen, the most helpful step is to define seafarers as
essential workers so that they can be exempt from travel restrictions. However, many
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governments that list pilots, cabin crew, and truck drivers as essential workers have
refused to do so for merchant seafarers. Secondly, seafarers should be allowed to go
ashore during port calls to purchase essential supplies and seek medical services.
With the help of personal protection equipment and practicing social distance, the
chance of spreading the covid-19 virus by seafarers going on shores will be very
limited. It’s also necessary to pay attention to the mental health of seafarers during
the pandemic. Of course the most effective measure would be allowing stranded
seafarers to go home. Besides, governments and charitable groups could set up
helplines to provide them with psychological counseling. Last but not least, seafarers
should be protected from the virus. They should be provided with timely updates on
the pandemic, practical health procedures, and adequate personal protection
equipment. Port states should provide shore side medical assistance to crew members
when them need it.

4.4 Chapter summary

Identifying meaningful human factors and addressing them require a system
approach. In order to reduce human errors, it is crucial to not only build crew
capacity and monitor their operation, but more importantly address the underlying
systemic difficulties. In the maritime industry, the culture of prioritizing ship
operations over safety must be changed so that the working environment and labor
conditions of crews are actually protected, not just ‘adjusted’ to meet compliance on
paper. This requires that regulatory authorities enforce regulations that protect the
interests of crew members, and that crew members are empowered to participate in
decision-making processes that affect their vital interests.
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The development and application of automation technology in the shipping industry
will not eliminate the human element from the process. In the best case scenario,
they will be transferred to another place, i.e. on shore, in another form. In utilizing
technology, there should be a human-centered approach, so that the technology
serves both the crew and safety.

Hundreds of thousands of crew members have been forced to work on board longer
than their labor contracts because of the Covid-19 pandemic, causing severe fatigue
and affecting their mental health. It is a major threat to maritime safety and the
environment, as well as the welfare of seafarers. To resolve this serious problem,
governments, international organizations, and the shipping industry must work
together.
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5

Summary and conclusions

This paper reviews the history and current state of research on human factors in
maritime accidents and introduces research methods like HFACS, Bayesian
Networks, and Tree Augmented Networks. In an effort to analyze the human factors
in ship collisions based on Chinese ship collision investigation reports, this paper
presents Chinese understanding of ship collisions, and analyses the human factors in
ship collisions using the HAFCS model, which was first proposed in aviation safety.
A feasibility study of HFACS for analyzing human factors in maritime accidents is
derived from comparing the same and different aspects of two different industries, air
and maritime transportation. Four levels of HFACS are analyzed in detail in order to
analyze human factors in ship collisions: organizational influences, unsafe
supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts.

In the analysis of the 21 collision accidents, the human factors were classified and
analyzed. It was found that the factors at the level of unsafe acts accounted for the
highest proportion of human factors in all the accidents and should be the basis for
preventing ship collision accidents. Human factors of ship collision accidents can be
effectively explored in depth using HFACS, which expands the application scope of
accident investigation reports for accident causation research.
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This paper is limited in its scope, and a larger sample size would be necessary to
obtain a more in-depth understanding. Maritime accident investigation reports
contain a wealth of information that can be used to better understand maritime safety
and accident prevention. China's maritime accident reports, however, tend to focus
on direct and explicit factors that cause accidents and neglect indirect and potentially
dangerous factors, such as organizational climate and processes.

This paper argues that in order to mitigate the human factors, we cannot take a
person approach, i.e., interventions that are only directed at unsafe acts and
preconditions for unsafe acts, and must find solutions from unsafe supervision and
organizational influences. To achieve this, authorities and industry must adopt a
system approach, change the maritime culture of efficiency over safety and the rigid,
top-down corporate management structure, and empower crew members to be
involved in policy-making. Only then can we truly improve the labor conditions of
crew members, rather than merely complying with crew protection regulations on
paper.

A growing number of stakeholders in the shipping sector are taking an interest in
automation technology on board ships, particularly technology for unmanned ships.
Even if commercial unmanned ships were to become a reality, the human factor
would still have to play an important role. As such, the human factor could merely be
shifted to other places in different forms. To improve safety and efficiency through
technology, the development and application of technology must be human-centered,
because technological systems require people to operate, monitor, and maintain them.
A misuse of technology can have the opposite effect.
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The Covid-19 pandemic has been ongoing for a year and a half, and has had wrought
havoc on the shipping industry. As a result of government measures to contain the
outbreak, including border closures, travel restrictions, quarantine requirements, and
other measures, crew changes have been extremely challenging and in many cases
have been impossible. Many crew members are forced to work on board for longer
periods beyond their contracts, leading to fatigue and psychological and mental stress,
which has a negative impact on human life and property at sea. International
organizations, governments and shipping industry need to collaborate to protect and
assist crews while safeguarding the sustainable growth of the international shipping
industry.
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